Quick Hits
- In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, the Second Circuit held that, to bring a failure to accommodate claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employee must show that the need for a religious accommodation provided motive for an adverse employment decision.
- The court’s decision revokes the Second Circuit’s previous prima facie test for a Title VII claim of failure to accommodate religion and adopts the test set forth in the 2015 Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
- The Second Circuit ruling reinforces that, to establish a prima facie case of failure to provide a religious accommodation, a plaintiff must show that he or she required an accommodation of religious practice and that the employer’s desire to avoid the required accommodation was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.
Title VII prohibits employers from firing, disciplining, or discriminating against employees because of their religious belief, practice, or observance. It requires employers to provide a reasonable religious accommodation, unless it would impose an undue hardship on the employer, meaning a substantial cost or difficulty.
Background on the Case
Jessica Bergin, a court officer for the New York Unified Court System (UCS), requested a religious exemption from UCS’s requirement to receive a COVID-19 vaccination by October 18, 2021. She submitted an initial written request in September 2021, stating her religious objections. USC asked her to fill out a supplemental form with additional questions about the request, and she returned that form without answering many of the questions. After UCS denied her request, she submitted a new form with the questions answered in January 2022. USC responded that the new submission would not be considered. It placed her on administrative leave and then terminated her employment in April 2022 for failure to comply with the vaccination requirement. UCS ended its vaccination requirement in February 2023 and reinstated Bergin’s employment in June 2023. Bergin sued for religious discrimination under Title VII.
In November 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted partial summary judgment for Bergin, holding that Bergin had established a prima facie case that she “(1) held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement, (2) informed her employer of that belief, and (3) was disciplined for failure to comply with the requirement.” The district court held that the employer did not demonstrate that granting an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship. It also found that permitting the employee to submit an untimely supplemental form would constitute undue hardship on the employer.
UCS appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong prima facie test to the case—that the court should have taken into account the test articulated in the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., issued in 2015. The Second Circuit agreed.
Second Circuit Ruling
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the basis that the district court applied the wrong prima facie test to the failure to accommodate religion claim. It stated that, under Title VII, to sue for failure to accommodate a religious belief or practice, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they required an accommodation of their religious practice and that the employer’s desire to avoid the required accommodation “was a motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment decision, such as firing or refusing to hire.
The Second Circuit relied on Abercrombie, which found that an employer violates Title VII if it refuses to hire a job applicant to avoid accommodating a religious practice. The Second Circuit stated that “[t]he Supreme Court explained that failure-to-accommodate-religion claims fall within Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, which ‘prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.’” Thus, the key inquiry is the employer’s motive for the adverse employment action, not whether the employee informed the employer of the need for a religious accommodation. The court explained that, although knowledge of the need for an accommodation may be evidenceof motive, the absence of such evidence is not dispositive.
The court officer contended that Abercrombie did not apply to her case because it related to failure to hire, rather than wrongful termination, but the Second Circuit rejected that argument, stating that such argument “runs headlong into the statutory text [of Title VII], which treats hiring and firing alike.”
The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
Next Steps
Employers in the Second Circuit faced with failure to accommodate religion claims may want to assess the case under the Abercrombie test, rather than the previously prescribed Second Circuit test. The Second Circuit decision suggests that, if a plaintiff cannot establish the factors under the Abercrombie test, the case may be dismissed prior to the employer having to establish its undue hardship defense.
Employers may wish to train managers to comply with state and federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination, including the fact that an employee is not required to inform the employer of the need for a religious accommodation to trigger the obligation to accommodate.
Ogletree Deakins’ Leaves of Absence/Reasonable Accommodation Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Connecticut, Employment Law, Leaves of Absence, New York, and Vermont blogs as additional information becomes available.
Leslie A. Lajewski is a shareholder in Ogletree Deakins’ Morristown office.
This article was co-authored by Leah J. Shepherd, who is a writer in Ogletree Deakins’ Washington, D.C., office.
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