Supreme Court to Review Whether Title IX Allows Employee Discrimination Claims

00:00

24:53

Quick Hits

• The Supreme Court will determine if employees at federally funded educational institutions can bring sex-discrimination in employment claims under Title IX.
• The petitioners asked the high court to review an Eleventh Circuit decision, holding that Title IX does not provide a private right of action for employment-related sex discrimination.
• Petitioners argued that there is a “lopsided” 8–3 circuit split on the issue.

On May 18, 2026, the Supreme Court granted a joint petition for a writ of certiorari in Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, No. 25–183. The case could answer whether employees of colleges, universities, and other federally funded educational institutions can use Title IX as a vehicle for workplace claims of sex discrimination, or whether such claims may only be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The question is significant because Title IX, which generally prohibits sex-based discrimination in the educational setting, and Title VII, which generally prohibits sex discrimination in the employment setting, address discrimination in different ways and offer different remedies. Specifically, Title VII imposes administrative exhaustion requirements requiring claimants to first submit a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), shorter limitations periods, and caps on compensatory damages.

Petitioners’ Alleged Sex-Based Discrimination Under Title IX

Petitioner MaChelle Joseph, the women’s basketball coach at the Georgia Institute of Technology (“Georgia Tech”) from 2003 until 2019, sued the university, alleging she was discharged after raising concerns about disparities in resources between the men’s and women’s basketball programs. She filed a lawsuit alleging claims under both Title IX and Title VII.

Petitioner Thomas Crowther filed a lawsuit against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia under Title IX, alleging he was treated differently based on sex during a Title IX investigation. The investigation was prompted by two student complaints and ultimately found violations of the university’s sexual harassment policy.

Eleventh Circuit Finds No Private Right of Action

The Eleventh Circuit consolidated both cases on appeal and held that Title IX does not create an implied private right of action for sex discrimination in the employment context and dismissed Joseph’s related Title VII claims. The Eleventh Circuit stated that “[a]lthough [Title IX] also provides an implied right of action for students—who would otherwise have no statutory remedy to enforce their substantive right under Title IX—the terms of the statute do not embrace a private right of action for employees.”

The Eleventh Circuit further noted that “Title VII’s express remedial scheme” made it “anomalous to conclude that the implied right of action under Title IX would allow employees of educational institutions immediate access to judicial remedies unburdened by administrative procedures.”

Arguments on Whether to Review

The petitioners pointed to the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, in which the Court allowed an employee to bring a Title IX retaliation claim after complaining about sex discrimination. The petitioners argued that, since Jackson, five circuits addressed the issue and found an implied right of action under Title IX for employees to sue for sex discrimination in employment. Arguably, a total of eight circuits have interpreted Title IX to permit private claims for sex discrimination in employment.

With the Eleventh Circuit’s joining the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in holding that Title IX does not provide such an implied right of action, the petitioners argued, there is now a “lopsided” 8–3 circuit split that the high court should address. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit decision means that employees within the circuit will have different rules than employees of other schools in the same collegiate athletic conferences, they argued.

However, the respondents disputed that the circuit split was as clear as the petitioners contended, particularly on whether Title VII is the proper path for employment discrimination claims. They contended that the cases were not a good vehicle for addressing the issues, particularly because Joseph raised parallel Title VII claims that were dismissed.

Notably, the federal government filed an amicus brief, contending that the Eleventh Circuit was likely correct that Title IX does not provide a private right of action for employment-based sex discrimination but urged the Supreme Court to review the case because resolving the alleged circuit split would have significant consequences for litigants, courts, and federal enforcement.

Next Steps

The grant of certiorari means the Supreme Court will hear the case during its October 2026 Term, though oral arguments have not yet been scheduled. Educational institutions may want to monitor the case closely, as it has the potential to reshape the avenues and claims available to employees alleging workplace sex discrimination.

A decision in favor of the petitioners could reinforce Title IX as a parallel path alongside Title VII for employees of federally funded educational institutions to bring employment-based sex discrimination claims and could increase the potential liability for such institutions. A decision for the respondents could limit Title IX as a workaround for employment discrimination claims. More broadly, the federal government suggested that the case could address the question of whether courts may extend implied rights of action.

Ogletree Deakins’ Higher Education Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance, Employment Law, Higher Education, and Sports and Entertainment blogs as additional information becomes available.

Follow and Subscribe
LinkedIn | Instagram | Webinars | Podcasts