Quick Hits
- The Second Circuit amended its July 2026 decision, clarifying that the decision was not meant to establish that a heightened motive requirement exists for failure-to-accommodate cases.
- The court clarified that employees need not prove discriminatory animus against religion to substantiate their claims, but they must show that the denial was motivated by a desire to avoid the accommodation.
The case, Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, involved an officer of the New York Unified Court System (UCS) who had requested a religious exemption from UCS’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement. UCS denied the request after the employee initially failed to answer supplemental questions and refused to reconsider. The employee was later placed on administrative leave and then discharged.
In its July 15, 2026, decision, the Second Circuit found that the employee failed to bring a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and remanded the case back to the district court for reconsideration. The court held that to state a prima facie case, an employee must allege: (1) the need for an accommodation of a religious practice, (2) “the employer’s desire to avoid” the accommodation “was a motivating factor,” and (3) “an adverse employment decision.”
The Second Circuit’s amended opinion adds a footnote clarifying that it does “not suggest that a new, heightened discriminatory motive requirement exists in failure-to-accommodate cases.”
“That is to say, an employee asserting a failure-to-accommodate claim need not show that an employer’s denial of an accommodation was motivated by discriminatory animus against religion,” the Second Circuit stated in the footnote. (Emphasis in original)
The initial ruling relied on the 2015 Supreme Court of the United States decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. That case held that an employee need not inform an employer of a need for a religious accommodation to assert a Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim, but must show that the employer was motivated by the need for a religious exemption when making an adverse employment decision. The Second Circuit found that Abercrombie overturned its prior rule requiring employees to inform their employer of their need for an accommodation and clarified that what a plaintiff must plead and, ultimately prove, is “that the employer was motivated in part by the desire to avoid offering a religious accommodation.”
“But, consistent with Abercrombie, the employee does have to show that the denial was ‘because’ of the employee’s religion as opposed to, say, the employee’s failure to timely provide sufficient information,” the new footnote stated.
The amended decision also added another footnote clarifying that, in this case, the employee’s discharge alone “constitutes a cognizable adverse employment action.” The court thus “did not need to and did not decide whether the failure to accommodate itself constitutes an adverse employment action.”
Key Takeaways
The Second Circuit’s amendments to its initial opinion are significant. The Second Circuit clarified that it did not adopt a “heightened” motive requirement that would require employees to allege “animus” against a religious practice. Still, the ruling provides employers with authority to defend against claims for denial of a requested religious accommodation. It makes clear that when an employee fails to establish a prima facie case under Abercrombie, their claims could be dismissed prior to an employer having to establish an undue hardship.
Ogletree Deakins’ Leaves of Absence/Reasonable Accommodation Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Connecticut, COVID-19/Coronavirus, Employment Law, Leaves of Absence, New York, State Developments, and Vermont blogs as additional information becomes available.
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